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Deconstruction began as a series of techniques invented by Jacques 
Derrida, Paul de Man, and others to analyze literary and philosophical 
texts.  These techniques, in turn, were connected to larger philosophical 
claims about the nature of language and meaning.  One such assertion is 
that the repetition of a text in a new context often subtly changes its 
meaning.  There could be no better example of this principle than the 
career of deconstruction itself.  To be adapted to the needs and concerns 
of the legal academy, deconstruction had to be translated and altered in 
significant ways, making it more flexible, practical, and attentive to 
questions of justice and injustice.  This essay describes some of the 
changes that deconstruction underwent as it moved from philosophy to 
literature and then to law.  Its transformation eventually produced a 
deconstructive practice that emphasizes sensitivity to changes in 
interpretive context, a pragmatic approach to conceptual distinctions, 
and careful attention to the role of ideology and social construction in 
legal thought. 
Deconstruction was first imported from Continental philosophy to 
American literature departments and later migrated to American law 
schools.  Deconstruction became fashionable in America at about the 
same time as reader response theory, which held that the meaning of a 
text is produced as the reader encounters it.  As a result, deconstruction 
became wrongly associated with the improbable claim that texts mean 
whatever readers want them to mean.  This notion is not only a 
misinterpretation of deconstruction, but also of reader response theory. 
This idea would have seemed especially silly in Europe, where 
deconstruction arose out of an earlier philosophical movement called 
structuralism.  Because deconstruction was understood as a reaction to 
structuralism, it is sometimes called a “post-structuralist” philosophy. 
Both deconstruction and structuralism are antihumanist theories; 
that is, they emphasize that people’s thought is shaped by structures of 
linguistic and cultural meaning.  Both deconstruction and structuralism 
asserted that people are culturally and socially constructed, and that they 
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internalize culture in much the same way that they internalize a 
language.  A speaker of English cannot make the words of that language 
mean whatever she likes; more importantly, she doesn’t even want this 
to be the case, because part of being an English speaker is having 
internalized a sense of the proper way of talking and thinking.  For the 
structuralist and the post-structuralist, language speaks us as much as 
we speak it. 
As this example demonstrates, an antihumanist approach tends to 
deemphasize people’s autonomy from cultural influences; it views 
people as the product of cultural forces largely beyond their control.  In 
its most extreme forms, it tends to dissolve the individual (sometimes 
called “the subject”) into structures of social meaning.  
Deconstructionists attacked the structuralist assumption that one could 
identify universal and/or fixed structures of meaning that shaped all 
human thought.  Deconstructionists argued that structures of social 
meaning are always unstable, indeterminate, impermanent and 
historically situated, constantly changing over time and accumulating 
new connections, associations and connotations.  But these criticisms 
didn’t challenge the idea that individuals were constructed by larger 
social and linguistic forces, and deconstructionsts didn’t dispute that 
individuals were not fully in control of the forces of social and linguistic 
meaning. 
How this antihumanist philosophy was translated into the claim 
that people can make texts mean whatever they want is something of a 
mystery.  The indecipherability of a lot of deconstructive writing 
probably contributed to the confusion.  In addition, the point of much of 
contemporary literary criticism is to come up with new and original 
readings of older texts.  This project doesn’t sit well with a philosophy 
that asserts that the critic, like the author, doesn’t have very much 
control over what she thinks. 
When deconstruction moved from literature departments to the 
legal academy, it was modified further.  Legal academics on the left, 
particularly feminists and members of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
movement, saw deconstruction as a way of challenging legal 
orthodoxies.  They assumed pretty much without question that they 
could adapt deconstructive techniques to critique unjust legal doctrines 
and advocate more just arrangements.  Once again, this assumption is 
rather puzzling.  It is true that many literary deconstructionists identified 
with the political left.  But they were using deconstruction to show the 
impenetrability, mutability, and conceptual incoherence of all texts, not 
simply the texts produced by political conservatives.  In fact, in the 
literary world, many people argued that deconstruction was a 
profoundly conservative movement.  The recognition that any text could 
be deconstructed and that all meanings were unstable might lead to 
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political quiescence.  Nevertheless, these warnings did not raise much 
alarm in legal circles.  Legal academics began deconstructing left and 
right, or, more correctly, almost exclusively to the left.  No attempt was 
made, at least at first, to consider whether deconstruction had a 
necessarily or predominantly progressive slant, or whether, on the 
contrary, it was particularly unsuited to political critique because it 
threatened to undermine any political program or philosophical 
conception of social justice. 
Bringing deconstruction into law schools also required a new focus 
on the point of deconstruction.  Legal theorists were primarily interested 
in using deconstruction for normative or critical purposes.  They wanted 
to criticize some (but not other) doctrinal distinctions as incoherent, 
they wanted to show that some (but not other) parts of the law were 
unjust and needed reform, and they wanted to demonstrate that some 
(but not other) ways of thinking had undesirable ideological effects that 
concealed important features of social life and therefore promoted or 
sustained injustices.  But each of these tasks faced two central problems. 
The first difficulty was that literary deconstruction was not 
primarily devoted to these normative and critical purposes.  Indeed, 
literary deconstruction spent much of its time showing the ambiguity, 
uncertainty, and impenetrability of all literary texts, the reversibility of 
all positions, and the instability of all theoretical conceptions.  It did not 
focus specifically on pointing the way to a more just world. 
To use deconstruction, lawyers would have to adapt it so that it 
could serve a critical and normative function.  Deconstruction would 
have to mean something different for lawyers than it would for literary 
critics and philosophers.  Deconstruction would become a series of 
rhetorical strategies for criticizing certain legal doctrines and legal 
arguments in order to show that they were unjust, ideologically biased, 
incomplete, or incoherent.  It would necessarily discriminate between 
better and worse positions and interpretations, and it would state its 
conclusions in the language of normative prescription.  Deconstructive 
legal argument, in short, would become a form of normative legal 
thought.  Among legal scholars, Pierre Schlag has been virtually alone 
in recognizing this change and speaking out against it.1  Schlag has thus 
taken the seemingly paradoxical position of opposing the use of 
deconstruction for normative purposes.2 
The second problem in bringing deconstruction into legal thought 
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arose from the first.  Implicit in the task of normative criticism was the 
assumption that other legal arguments and legal doctrines were not in 
need of such critique, even though they too could be deconstructed in 
theory.  Thus, legal deconstruction had to distinguish what was 
deconstructible (everything) from what was unjust, practically 
incoherent, or practically unworkable (only some things).  Legal 
deconstruction necessarily aimed only at certain targets, and not others.  
Legal scholars on the left wanted to deconstruct Justice Scalia’s 
opinions on affirmative action, but not Justice Brennan’s establishment 
clause opinions.  In legal scholarship at least, deconstruction necessarily 
had a pragmatic orientation.  If it wasn’t broken, one wouldn’t 
deconstruct it. 
Of course, this selectivity was always present in literary and 
philosophical deconstruction too, although the reasons for selecting 
particular texts for deconstruction were somewhat different.  Derrida 
himself was very particular about which texts he chose to deconstruct, 
because he thought that some (but not others) were rich sources of 
philosophical insight.  Deconstruction’s universalistic pronouncements 
about the problematic nature of all texts, all language, and all readings 
tended to obscure the actual and selective use of deconstruction by 
literary critics and philosophers.  The movement of deconstruction to 
law made this selectivity more perspicuous.  It made clear that whatever 
deconstruction itself might be, deconstructive argument is, and always 
has been, a rhetorical technique used by scholars for pragmatic 
purposes.3  Derrida, after all, did not go around deconstructing his own 
arguments to show that they were incoherent. 
The movement to law also revealed more clearly that 
deconstructive analysis involves a series of repeatable rhetorical devices 
or tropes that can be adapted to many different problems and situations.  
Derrida and his followers have always insisted that deconstruction is not 
a method, and that it cannot be reduced to a set of techniques.  But this 
assertion is undermined by their actual practices of reading and 
argument.  After all, if deconstruction was to be perpetuated in the next 
generation of graduate students, these students had to learn how to do it, 
and this meant that there had to be some set of skills that could be 
repeated and transmitted from teacher to pupil.  As a result, the actual 
practice of deconstruction has tended to revolve around a relatively 
small handful of rhetorical techniques that can be learned, adopted, and 
adapted by other scholars.  Thus, although deconstruction claimed to be 
theoretically ineffable, it has proved practically repeatable and 
teachable. 
The most familiar forms of deconstructive argument involve the 
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manipulation of conceptual oppositions.4  One looks for the 
“privileging” of one pole of an opposition over the other.  This 
privileging can occur in a text, an argument, or a social or historical 
tradition.  It can be presupposed or stated overtly.  Given a conceptual 
opposition between A and B, A is privileged over B if A is the general 
case and B the special case, if A is primary and B secondary, if A is 
normal and B is deviant, if A is of higher status and B is of lower status, 
or if A is central and B is marginal.  A can also be privileged over B if A 
is considered more true, more relevant, more important, or more 
universal than B.  Conceptual oppositions exist in larger networks of 
cultural meanings and associations.  Hence, A can have many opposites 
besides B, depending on the context in which it is considered.  (Liberty, 
for example, can be opposed to slavery or to equality.)  A concept can 
be privileged in many different ways in opposition to many different 
concepts, and many different things can simultaneously be privileged 
over it. 
Once identified, a conceptual hierarchy can be deconstructed in a 
number of ways.  Normally the privileging of A over B is justified by 
reasons, either explicit or implicit.  So, the deconstructor can ask 
whether the reasons why A is privileged over B actually apply to B as 
well, or the reasons why B is thought subordinate to A are actually also 
true of A.  Alternatively, one can try to show that A is a special case of 
B, or that A’s existence or conceptual coherence depends on the thing it 
excludes or subordinates, namely, B.  The point of these various 
techniques is to rethink the relationship between conceptual opposites 
and observe previously hidden or submerged similarities and conceptual 
dependencies. 
Of course, such a deconstructive analysis, once undertaken, can 
always be extended further.  In theory, the possibilities of 
deconstruction are endless, but, in practice, the process of 
deconstruction must come—at least temporarily—to a halt.  This fact 
further reveals the essentially pragmatic nature of deconstructive 
analysis in law that was always present but was not always so clearly 
recognized in literary and philosophical versions.  (In fact, applying 
deconstructive techniques to those techniques themselves, we might say 
that the repetition of deconstruction in law revealed previously hidden 
or submerged tendencies in literary deconstruction.) 
A good example of how one deconstructs a privileging is Derrida’s 
well-known discussion of speech and writing.5  According to Derrida, 
many Western thinkers have valued speech over writing because speech 
 
 4 For some applications in legal argument, see J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and 
Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987). 
 5 See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gaytri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967). 
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is thought to be closer to the essence or “presence” of thought.  The 
speaking individual thinks as she speaks, and her words immediately 
convey what she wants to say.  Writing, on the other hand, is an inferior 
mode of expression because it can be separated from the presence of the 
writer’s thoughts.  It can be repeated in new contexts and 
misunderstood, and the author is not always present to correct any 
misunderstanding. 
It is by no means clear that Western thought has featured the sort 
of pervasive prejudice against writing that Derrida describes.  In any 
case, his deconstruction of the privileging runs as follows: If writing is 
less valuable because it consists of signs that can be separated from the 
author’s thoughts, this is also true of speech.  Speech is also just a set of 
repeatable signs that can be divorced from the author’s thoughts and 
intentions; for example, consider a recording of a person’s speech 
played over and over out of context.  In fact, speech is just a special 
case of those features of writing that philosophers considered inferior 
and untrustworthy.  Speech is also representational and repeatable in 
new contexts that change its meaning and create the possibility of 
misunderstanding.  In this sense, speech is just another kind of writing.  
Of course, when we say that speech is a kind of “writing,” we are really 
using the word “writing” to stand for writing’s most salient 
characteristic—that it is a linguistic representation that can be separated 
from its author and inserted into new contexts.  The point of Derrida’s 
deconstruction is to show that what seem to be opposites (speech and 
writing) actually share important characteristics—their semiotic nature 
as repeatable signs. 
The basic technique of reversing conceptual privilegings has 
obvious applications to legal and policy argument.  Law is full of 
conceptual oppositions because it is full of distinctions.  A distinction 
creates a conceptual opposition because it separates things inside the 
category from things that fall outside it.  Given a doctrinal or theoretical 
distinction between A and B, the legal scholar can locate the 
justifications for the exclusion of what falls into the class of B’s from 
the class of A’s and then proceed to deconstruct those justifications.  
She can argue that the justifications for the distinction undermine 
themselves, that categorical boundaries are unclear or at odds with the 
proffered justifications, or that the boundaries shift radically as they are 
placed in new contexts of judgment. 
Critical scholars in the feminist and Critical Legal Studies 
movements made the most frequent and familiar use of deconstruction 
in law.6  They employed deconstructive techniques to discover and 
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critique ideological commitments they claimed underlay legal doctrine.  
Deconstruction has proved particularly useful for ideological critique 
because ideologies often work through forms of privileging and 
suppression.  Certain features of social life are privileged in thought and 
discourse, while others are marginalized or suppressed.  Deconstructive 
arguments try to recover these subordinated or forgotten elements in 
legal thought and legal doctrine. 
A good example is the familiar critique of contract law offered by 
CLS scholars.7  It contrasts a dominant story about human relations in 
contract law with a marginalized story.  It then imagines how the 
marginalized story might be expanded to rethink the law of contract.  
According to the CLS critique, the dominant story of human relations in 
contract law imagines that autonomous individuals freely choose the 
terms of their bargains, and accept (or should accept) full responsibility 
if they choose badly.  The Critics point out, however, that much contract 
law (and much contracting) does not fit this model.  Rather, it is best 
understood as invoking an alternative story about human relations.  In 
this story, individuals cooperate with and rely on each other; they 
expect that they and others will not take advantage of each other even 
when this might be technically permissible.  Individuals are 
interdependent and need to cooperate to survive.  They often lack 
information, are emotionally vulnerable, and are often overborne by 
circumstances not of their own making.  Institutions like the market can 
be unfairly coercive and oppressive even as they purport to be the home 
of freedom and self-realization.  Deconstructive readings of contract law 
would explore how this countervision, if taken seriously, would change 
our understandings of appropriate contract doctrine. 
A related approach studies the legal justifications offered within a 
body of doctrine.  Often these are organized around a dominant 
principle or set of principles that are, in turn, connected to visions of 
human nature and social relations.  The deconstructionist looks for a set 
of marginalized counterprinciples.  These counterprinciples are either 
entirely suppressed or are conceded to have force only in exceptional or 
deviant situations.  In this way, one shows that the body of law features 
a hierarchy of privileged and subordinated elements and justifications.  
The deconstructionist then tries to show two things.  First, these 
subordinated counterprinciples have a greater significance and 
importance to maintaining the intellectual coherence of the body of 
doctrine than most people had thought.  Second, if one took these 
suppressed counterprinciples seriously and expanded their sphere of 
application and influence, they might radically change the content of 
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to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987). 
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legal doctrine. 
Each of the above techniques is a variation on the basic idea of 
reversing conceptual hierarchies.  Yet another technique focuses on the 
rhetoric of legal argument.  It studies the stylistics and word choices in a 
text.  Often the rhetorical features of a text undermine or contradict the 
argument made by the text: what the text does is often in tension with 
what it says.  Deconstructors can also look for unexpected relationships 
between seemingly unconnected parts of a text, or use the marginal 
elements of a text as an uncanny commentary on what appear to be its 
central elements.8  Deconstructors also can play with the multiple 
meanings or the etymology of key words in the text to tease out possible 
conflicts or ambiguities.  They often invoke puns and plays on words to 
show interesting connections and unexpected tensions between different 
parts of the argument.  Although these techniques focus on apparently 
peripheral elements of the text that seem unrelated to the logic of its 
argument, they often help display disturbances or problems in the logic 
of the text that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. 
For example, Justice Antonin Scalia has argued that the human 
rights guarantees of the U.S. Constitution should be determined by 
looking to the longstanding traditions of the American people.9  It turns 
out that “tradition” comes from the same word as “betrayal.”10  Both 
involve a handing over.  Claiming to speak in the name of tradition can 
also be a kind of betrayal in several different ways.  First, traditions are 
often contested.  Hewing to one particular vision of tradition obliterates 
other interpretations of the past and other alternatives for the future.  
Tradition never speaks with one voice, although, to be sure, persons of 
particular predilections may hear only one.  In this way, a tradition can 
be a kind of extradition, banishing other perspectives and handing them 
over to their enemies, so to speak.  Second, to respect tradition is also to 
betray, submerge, and extinguish other existing and competing 
traditions.  It can lead us to focus on a falsely unitary or unequivocal 
story about the meaning of the past when we should recognize the past 
as a complicated set of perspectives in tension with each other.  Finally, 
to act in the name of a tradition is often to betray the tradition itself, by 
disregarding the living, changing features of a tradition and substituting 
a determinate and lifeless simulacrum. 
These rhetorical techniques are yet another example of the general 
strategy of reversing privilegings and hierarchies.  We ordinarily 
assume that the figural features of a text are supplementary and 
 
 8 See, for example, J.M. Balkin, The Domestication of Law and Literature, 14 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 787 (1987), which focused on the dust jacket and the dedication page to Richard 
Posner’s Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (1988). 
 9 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). 
 10 See Balkin, supra note 3. 
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inessential to the coherence of its argument.  But deconstructive 
techniques assume that there is no permanent and acontextual boundary 
between the figural aspects of a text and its appeals to reason.  More 
generally, deconstruction argues that rhetoric has an important, although 
neglected, function in supporting our conceptions of what is reasonable.  
Metaphor, metonymy, and other figures play unacknowledged roles in 
the construction and judgment of legal and political argument.  
Sometimes figural elements provide essential support for the reasoning 
we find in legal and political texts; just as often, they uncannily 
comment on and undermine this reasoning.11 
Deconstructive readings do not assert that texts have no meaning 
or that their meanings are undecipherable.  Rather, deconstruction 
argues that texts are always overflowing with complicated and often 
contradictory meanings.  The predicament that deconstruction finds in 
texts is not the lack of meaning but a surplus of it.  Similarly, the point 
of deconstructing conceptual oppositions is not to show that concepts 
have no boundaries, but rather that their boundaries are fluid and appear 
differently as the opposition is placed into new interpretive contexts.  
Deconstruction is not a mechanical demonstration of total 
indeterminacy.  Deriving interesting results from deconstructive 
techniques is a skill that requires sensitivity to changes in interpretive 
context.  It does not attack reason but rather employs reason to critique 
particular forms of reasoning.  Moreover, deconstructing a legal 
distinction does not necessarily show that it is incoherent.  That is a 
pragmatic judgment to be made by the interpreter.  All legal distinctions 
are in principle deconstructible, but not all are unworkable; their 
usefulness depends on the context in which they are employed. 
To use a well-worn example, critical scholars have often 
deconstructed the familiar distinction between public and private choice 
and responsibility.  But the reason to deconstruct this distinction is not 
because these concepts have no value or use.  Rather one deconstructs 
the public/private distinction because that distinction is so often 
employed in a conclusory fashion that hides the important policy 
choices at stake. 
The deconstruction of the public/private distinction softens the 
boundaries between these two categories, but does not abolish them.  
For if we try to abolish the distinction between public and private 
power—by arguing that everything is an effect of public power or a 
choice for which government is responsible—we will find the concept 
of the private returning in a new guise.  Public and private exist in a 
relationship of différance—the two concepts are mutually dependent as 
 
 11 See, for example, J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1989), a 
deconstructive reading of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), and its 
famous footnote four, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
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well as mutually differentiated.  Because they are mutually dependent, 
one cannot get rid of one without destroying the other.  Moreover, to 
abolish the distinction between them privileges their similarity and 
interdependence over their differentiation, suppressing or hiding the 
latter.  This new privileging is itself subject to further deconstruction. 
For example, at one point in history, many people maintained that 
the state had no duty to prohibit private acts of racial discrimination.  
They argued that any harms arising from private discrimination resulted 
from private preferences rather than state decisionmaking, and they 
maintained that antidiscrimination laws unjustly interfered with the 
freedom of private individuals to choose with whom they would 
associate.  Critics responded by deconstructing this distinction between 
public and private power and responsibility.  After all, the state protects 
its citizens from many other economic and social harms produced by 
private choice: consumer protection and fair labor standards regulations 
are but two examples.  The government’s failure to protect its citizens 
from the harms of private racial discrimination delegates to private 
parties the power to inflict harms on each other that it does not bestow 
in other contexts, and it allows the perpetuation of racial stratification 
under the cover of freedom of association.  Protecting and enforcing 
“private preferences” in some contexts (racial discrimination) but not 
others (consumer protection) is a regulatory choice for which the state is 
ultimately responsible. 
Nevertheless, this argument does not completely explode or 
delegitimate the public/private distinction, for the distinction will 
always reappear in a new guise.  For example, should it follow from the 
previous argument that the state is responsible for harms that occur 
when parties are spurned by prospective spouses or lovers because they 
are of a different race?  There are good reasons why the state should not 
be held responsible for these private acts of discrimination: the selection 
of one’s spouse or lover is a matter of private individual choice and the 
government should not interfere with it.  To accept this argument, 
however, we must reinscribe the notion of a realm of private power, 
choice, and responsibility that is distinct from the effects of public 
power and for which the state is not responsible.  This deconstructs our 
earlier deconstruction of the public/private distinction. 
To be sure, one could deconstruct this deconstruction by pointing 
out that the government always shapes people’s private choices, even in 
their most intimate decisions, through its choice of legal regulations.  
The state actively proscribes race-based decisionmaking in a wide range 
of areas including education, housing, and the workplace; and the 
state’s network of family, property, social services, and tax laws clearly 
shapes incentives about whether, when, and how to marry, divorce, or 
remain single.  Against this background of intervention in matters of 
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race-based decisionmaking and in decisions about marriage and family 
formation, the state’s failure to proscribe racial discrimination in the 
choice of marital and sexual partners can hardly be viewed as a neutral 
stance or a position of nonintervention.  Rather, it is a policy choice for 
which the state is ultimately responsible.  Moreover, people’s racial 
preferences in choosing spouses and lovers are also influenced by their 
education and upbringing.  The state chooses to instill many different 
values through its educational system—including racial tolerance—but 
apparently not the importance of nondiscrimination in the choice of 
spouses and lovers.  This belies the state’s claim that it has no 
responsibility for producing a society in which people are unwilling to 
intermarry.  The state may ultimately be justified in its regulatory 
choice not to promote racial intermarriage, but that does not mean that it 
lacks responsibility for the choice or for the distribution of families that 
results. 
These sorts of arguments, to be sure, are hardly irrefutable.  But, to 
refute them, one has to reinscribe the notion of private choice, power, 
and responsibility in a new form.  Thus, one might respond that even if 
the state has a legitimate role in shaping racial tolerance through 
regulation and education, the state should not be permitted to press its 
citizens—or brainwash them—into choosing the kinds of spouses and 
lovers of which the state approves.  The state must respect private 
choice in such important and intimate areas of life.  Respect for 
individual liberty demands respect for a private sphere of 
decisionmaking, regardless of the consequences.  In this way, the 
distinction between public and private constantly reappears, no matter 
how often we attempt to cast it out.12 
This example leads to a larger point.  When we deconstruct 
conceptual oppositions like public and private, we are not necessarily 
trying to show that they form a false dichotomy.  We are trying to show 
that they form a nested opposition.13  A nested opposition is a 
conceptual opposition in which the two terms “contain” each other.  The 
metaphor of “containing” one’s opposite stands for a number of related 
concepts—similarity to the opposite, overlap with the opposite, being a 
special case of the opposite, conceptual or historical dependence upon 
the opposite, and reproduction of the opposite or transformation into the 
 
 12 The issue also reappears in adoption policy.  Some state adoption agencies allow 
prospective parents to state their preferences about the race of children they would be willing to 
adopt and then present them with children who match their preferences.  Does facilitating or 
accommodating these racial preferences involve state-supported racial discrimination?  Or, does it 
simply acknowledge that there must be a private sphere of decisionmaking in family formation?  
See R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences 
Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998).  
 13 The theory of nested oppositions is developed more fully in J.M. Balkin, Nested 
Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990) (book review). 
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opposite over time.  These forms of containment share a sort of 
Wittgensteinian family resemblance—they all bear similarities to each 
other, although one cannot point to a single property that all have in 
common. 
The most general way of stating the relationship between the terms 
of a nested opposition is that they bear a relationship of mutual 
dependence and differentiation.  The point of deconstructive analysis is 
to show how this similarity or this difference has been suppressed or 
overlooked.  It tries to find difference and opposition in purported 
similarity and similarity and mutual dependence in purported 
differentiation.  As a result, deconstructive arguments usually 
emphasize the contextual nature of judgments, because the relationship 
between conceptual opposites and the relative meanings of the opposed 
concepts change as they are inserted into new interpretive contexts. 
Like the opposition between public and private power, Derrida’s 
famous example of the hierarchy of speech and writing is a nested 
opposition.  Derrida deconstructs the distinction between them by 
showing that both are special cases of the same semiotic phenomenon.  
But a nested opposition is not the same thing as a false opposition.  
Even after Derrida deconstructs the hierarchy of speech over writing, he 
has not abolished the distinction between speech and writing, for speech 
is still spoken and writing is still written.  Derrida could only claim to 
have effaced the distinction between them if he maintained that the 
differences between them are unimportant to their true nature.  An 
essential property of speech and writing is their ability to function as 
repeatable signs; an accidental or inessential property is the fact that 
they are produced by a voice or with a pencil.  However, this commits 
Derrida to a distinction between essential and inessential properties, a 
distinction he would be unlikely to accept. 
The concept of nested opposition avoids these difficulties.  The 
reliability or utility of a conceptual opposition depends on the context in 
which it is understood and the purposes to which it is put.  In some 
interpretive contexts, the opposition is useful and makes sense, while in 
others it does not.  Deconstructive arguments identify the recurrent error 
of overextending conceptual distinctions to new contexts and new 
purposes where they may be inoperable, obstruct understanding, or 
promote injustice.  But deconstruction does not claim that all extensions 
of conceptual distinctions to new situations are illicit or unhelpful.  Nor 
does it argue for the destruction of all conceptual oppositions.  The 
latter view is not only incorrect, but incoherent, for deconstructive 
arguments implicitly rely on conceptual oppositions to do their work. 
The notion of a nested opposition is related to another important 
deconstructive concept: iterability.  Iterability is the ability of a sign to 
be repeated again in a new context.  When a sign is repeated in a new 
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context, it takes on a new set of cultural meanings and associations, 
which are both similar to and different from the previous incarnations.  
Thus, the iteration of the same sign in a new context creates a nested 
opposition between the two significations.  In repetition, the same text 
occurs twice, but its meanings are partially different.  Thus, repetition 
always creates the possibility of a divergence or opposition within a 
unity of meaning, because new contexts reveal new and different 
cultural associations.  Derrida sums up this phenomenon in his aphorism 
that “iterability alters.”14 
One application of the principle of iterability is the phenomenon of 
“ideological drift.”  Politicians and theorists alike continually make 
arguments that appeal to abstract policies and principles.  But when a 
policy or principle is repeated in new cultural surroundings, its 
meanings and cultural associations begin to change, and hence, its 
political valence begins to shift.15  A good example is the trope of 
colorblindness in equal protection law.  In 1896 (the year of Justice 
Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson16), colorblindness was a 
radical assertion of racial equality used to dismantle entrenched forms 
of status hierarchy; by 1996 colorblindness had become the rallying cry 
of conservatives who opposed affirmative action programs that were 
designed to disestablish racial stratification and help undo the effects of 
past racial discrimination.  The social context in which the trope of 
colorblindness appeared had changed in the intervening years.  As a 
result, liberals who supported affirmative action and conservatives who 
opposed it could both claim to be heirs of Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
his dream of an America where children were judged not by the color of 
their skin but the content of their character.  For liberals, King’s appeal 
to colorblindness in the 1960s was a call for an end to racial 
subordination in all of its forms, while, for conservatives, the trope of 
colorblindness applied to the benefit of whites as well as blacks.  
Liberals thought that the trope had outlived its usefulness when it was 
no longer connected to the project of ending racial subordination, while 
conservatives claimed that it continued to embody a fundamental 
principle of political fairness, as valid now as a hundred years ago. 
The phenomenon of ideological drift is related to the multivalent 
meanings of a tradition, and to the important connections between 
tradition and betrayal.  Ideological drift guarantees that the concrete 
exemplars and symbols of a tradition will take on multiple and 
conflicting meanings and implications over time.  As a result, different 
groups can claim to be faithful adherents of the tradition and yet wish to 
 
 14 JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC A B C . . .  (1977). 
 15 See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 
(1993). 
 16 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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continue it in radically different ways.  Traditions are thus the result of 
and the site of interpretive struggles between adherents all of whom 
claim to be faithful to the tradition.  Each group, however, wishes to 
consolidate and continue the tradition in ways that seem like a betrayal 
from the perspective of the other camps.  We might say, then, that the 
seeming unity of any tradition is actually, on closer inspection, a 
complicated set of nested oppositions, whose conflicts may appear only 
with the passage of time and the arrival of new circumstances.  
Traditions often try to submerge and suppress their multiple meanings, 
enshrining some interpretations as orthodoxy and banishing others as 
heresy.  Yet the multiplicity of meanings and the instability of 
interpretations continue to emerge incessantly as the tradition travels 
through history. 
Although deconstruction is naturally associated with literary 
interpretation, its applications to legal interpretation are far less clear.  
Deconstructing legal texts is not primarily designed to show the 
impenetrability or undecideability of these texts.  The connection 
between deconstructive theory and the practice of legal interpretation 
lies elsewhere.  Deconstruction is helpful in showing the sensitivity of 
legal meaning to changes in interpretive context, and uncovering the 
competing policies and potentialities buried in the words and 
expressions of legal texts.  Often key words in a statute or doctrine 
disguise a nested opposition of possible interpretations.  Deconstruction 
can uncover these warring conceptions and bring them to the surface. 
Finally, deconstructive theory emphasizes that no theory of legal 
interpretation can be foundational in the sense of offering a primary or 
central method.  None of the familiar methods of legal interpretation—
canons of textual construction, history, structure, precedent, 
consequences, or natural justice—can stand as a self-sufficient ground 
for legal interpretation.  Nor can any one be elevated above the others as 
a general rule.  Rather, deconstruction argues that interpretation is a 
pragmatic enterprise drawing on each of these modes of argument in a 
creative tension.  The art of legal interpretation is the art of using the 
multiple tools of interpretation without being able to rely on any single 
tool as foundational.17 
No doubt legal interpretation begins with the text, but it can hardly 
end there.  We cannot treat the various modalities of interpretation as 
mere supplements that we apply only in limited cases of interpretive 
difficulty because we cannot always be certain when and where 
interpretive difficulties will arise.  Even the most obvious examples of 
seemingly unambiguous texts produce interpretive problems when they 
 
 17 For two different versions of this thesis, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1991) and WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994). 
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appear in new and unexpected contexts.  Take, for example, the United 
States Constitution’s requirements in Article I, Section 3 that “[t]he 
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from 
each State” and in Article V that “no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”18  During Reconstruction, 
the Radical Republican Congress refused to seat delegations from the 
former Confederacy until their states agreed to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment; moreover, Congress was able to pass the proposed 
amendment by the required two-thirds margin only because Southern 
senators had been excluded from the vote. 
The seemingly unproblematic character of the requirement of two 
senators and the equal suffrage clause becomes complicated once we 
recognize that a so-called “plain meaning” approach might undermine 
the legality of the Fourteenth Amendment.19  The purpose of this 
example is not to show that meaning is radically indeterminate, but that 
its determinacy depends on close attention to context and careful 
judgment using a number of competing factors, none of which can be 
considered foundational.  Above all, one should not confuse this 
argument with the claim that text and legislative intentions are 
unimportant to interpretation, and that consequences are all.  The 
deification of consequences is simply foundationalism in another form.  
Implicit in the textuality of a statute is the possibility that its best 
interpretation can fail to be the best social policy.  If consequences were 
the only determinant of interpretation, there would be no reason to have 
a written text at all.  One could simply decide the best course to take in 
each case. 
Although deconstructive arguments appear in critical race theory, 
feminist, and postmodern legal scholarship, deconstruction first 
emerged most clearly in the work of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement.  Deconstruction attracted Critical Legal Studies scholars for 
three reasons.  First, CLS scholars emphasized the instability and 
indeterminacy of legal doctrines and the political ideologies that lay 
behind legal reasoning.  Deconstruction’s discovery of mutability in 
meanings and conceptual boundaries seemed to support these views.  If, 
 
 18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; art. V. 
 19 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOLUME TWO: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).  
Akhil Amar has recently argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was fully legal because the 
Southern states were not “republican” and Congress has the power to judge the qualifications of 
the members of each house under Article I, Section 5, as well as the power to guarantee the states 
a “Republican Form of Government” under Article IV, Section 4.  Congress therefore could 
exclude senators from states which it judged to lack republican governments.  AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 368-79 (2005).  In Amar’s view, the equal 
suffrage provision in Article V only relates to the content of constitutional amendments; it does 
not prohibit Congress from refusing to seat senators whose qualifications it doubts.  Hence, the 
“plain meaning” of these provisions is perfectly consistent with exclusion of Southern senators 
and congressmen during Reconstruction.   
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as deconstruction suggested, all legal decisionmaking and all legal 
categories were flexible and mutable, this seemed to buttress the claim 
that something other than legal reasoning—like political judgment—lay 
behind legal decisionmaking.20 
Second, the force of the deconstructive critique applied beyond 
legal meanings to all social meanings.  Deconstruction seemed to 
suggest that social structures were also unstable and indeterminate.  
This meshed well with CLS claims that legal consciousness was based 
on the “false necessity” of social and legal structures that seemed 
reasonable in theory but were oppressive in practice.21 
Finally, deconstruction seemed attractive to CLS scholars because 
it held that texts undermined their own logic and had multiple and 
conflicting meanings.  Critical Legal Studies scholars could use 
deconstructive techniques to “trash” traditional legal arguments and 
legal distinctions by showing that they were incoherent. 
Nevertheless, CLS’s appropriation of deconstruction was 
problematic.  To begin with, deconstruction’s claims of indeterminacy 
proved too much.  If legal argument was indeterminate, so too was 
political argument, and so CLS scholars could not assert that it was 
really politics and not autonomous legal reasoning that decided cases.  
Moreover, the idea that judges could manipulate indeterminate legal 
language seemed to assume an autonomous legal subject who was in 
control of her beliefs and meanings.  But deconstruction argued that 
individuals were socially constructed and social meanings were largely 
beyond their deliberate control.  Hence, it was difficult to claim that 
legal reasoning was merely a disguise for political reasoning.  Rather, 
the language of law constructed the consciousness and shaped the 
thought of legal scholars and judges as much as did the categories of 
politics. 
In fact, deconstruction pointed to a quite different account of 
judicial decisionmaking.  Instead of arguing that legal doctrine was 
indeterminate, one could argue that social construction placed 
constraints on legal decisionmaking and helped produce the internal 
sense in lawyers and judges that some arguments were better than 
others.  Legal consciousness helped create the sort of legal subjects who 
naturally understood that certain kinds of legal claims were “on-the-
wall” and others “off-the-wall.”  Ideology, then, was not a source of 
indeterminacy but of constraint.22 
Second, the antihumanist assumptions of deconstruction tended to 
undermine the notion of “false necessity” implicit in CLS scholarship.  
Social structures and legal doctrines might be “contingent” in the sense 
 
 20 See Dalton, supra note 6; Frug, supra note 6. 
 21 See Peller, supra note 6. 
 22 See J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1991) (book review). 
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that they did not have to take any particular form, but once they were in 
place they would not melt away simply by an act of will.  Moreover, 
changes and reforms would have to be implemented using the social 
meanings and social structures already in place.  Individuals who had 
been socially conditioned to see existing social structures and legal 
categories as normal and natural would not easily be able to transcend 
the limits of their perspectives.  Moreover, it might be difficult to 
change conventional social meanings and practices that were grounded 
in the interlocking expectations and actions of vast numbers of people.  
Even if conventions were “conventional” rather than necessary, that did 
not mean that they were not also durable and powerful, offering 
considerable resistance to attempts to alter or overthrow them.  
Deconstruction did suggest that legal and social structures had unstable 
and flexible boundaries, but it did not imply that these structures could 
easily be transformed through individual thought or effort.  Even if legal 
concepts had multiple meanings, it did not follow that individuals would 
be able to manipulate and change the shared social meanings of these 
concepts in any way they liked; moreover, their social construction 
suggested that they would not even desire to change shared meanings in 
some of these ways.23 
Third, using deconstruction to demonstrate the incoherence of the 
categories and distinctions of legal orthodoxy proved entirely too much.  
If the concepts and categories used by the status quo were 
deconstructible, so too would be any concepts and categories offered by 
Critical Legal Scholars.  If deconstructibility meant incoherence, then it 
also meant the incoherence of any positive progressive program for 
Critical Legal Studies and any radical alternatives to mainstream legal 
thought. 
British critical thinkers tried a somewhat different strategy—they 
argued that mainstream legal thought used rhetorical figures that helped 
disguise and sustain serious injustices in the legal system.24  But this 
approach also tended to prove too much.  One could not condemn these 
moves simply because they were rhetorical.  After all, deconstructive 
arguments suggested that rhetorical and figural language would always 
play some role in legal and political argument; the only question was 
whether this influence would be acknowledged or suppressed.  
Exposing the rhetoricity of contemporary legal argument and legal 
doctrine could not, without more, delegitimate it, because the rhetorical 
 
 23 See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (l989). 
 24 See, e.g., COSTAS DOUZINAS, RONNIE WARRINGTON & SHAUN MCVEIGH, POSTMODERN 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW (1991); PETER GOODRICH, 
LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS (1990); PETER 
GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC, AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(1987). 
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nature of practical argument and practical judgment is inescapable. 
We can draw two important lessons from CLS’s encounter with 
deconstruction.  First, CLS scholars were most successful using 
deconstruction pragmatically rather than programmatically, as a 
technique for the analysis of specific problems in specific areas rather 
than a means of showing global incoherence and indeterminacy in 
mainstream legal thought.  Critical Legal Studies scholars used 
deconstructive methods most fruitfully to tease out suppressed 
principles in doctrine, unearthing the clash of principle and 
counterprinciple in seemingly unitary and coherent bodies of law.  
Deconstructive arguments also came in handy when critical scholars 
showed how justifications for particular legal doctrines and distinctions 
undermined themselves, and how the ideologies underlying these 
doctrines marginalized or suppressed important features of human life.  
These targeted and focused uses of deconstruction were more successful 
precisely because deconstruction works in the interstices of specific 
texts and specific problems, inviting contextual judgments rather than 
grand generalizations.  Indeed, such generalizations are a prime target of 
deconstructive scrutiny. 
Second, critical scholars employed deconstruction most 
successfully when they came to terms with deconstruction’s 
antihumanist heritage.  Doing so reoriented the so-called indeterminacy 
critique often associated with CLS.  The point was not to show how 
legal doctrine could be manipulated to justify a particular judge’s 
politics.  Rather, it was to show how well-meaning legal decisionmakers 
could see the world in such a way that they really felt that they had no 
choice in how to apply the law. 
Traditionally, debates over indeterminacy had been organized 
around the problem of the “rogue judge”: the ideologue whose political 
predilections led him or her to bend the law to his or her own will.  
Because of these dangers, the rogue judge had to be constrained by rules 
and doctrines.  That is why the indeterminacy critique seemed so 
threatening; critical scholars claimed that many legal rules and doctrines 
could not do the work demanded of them.  Critical scholars infuriated 
defenders of mainstream legal culture because they asserted that the 
shackles that could bind the rogue judge were often illusory. 
But deconstruction transformed this classic jurisprudential 
problem.  The difficulty was not that ideology made law indeterminate 
but that it produced a brittle, oppressive determinacy.  The problem was 
not the rogue judge but the sincere judge.  This judge was always 
bound, not merely by doctrine but also by the limits of his or her 
political and legal imagination.  Social construction caused individuals 
to understand the world in ways that made it difficult for them to 
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envision alternative ways of ordering law and society.25 
I noted earlier that many legal academics on the left had assumed 
without much debate that deconstruction could be harnessed to promote 
a progressive political agenda.  In 1987, these assumptions were given a 
rude shock when scholars learned of Paul de Man’s wartime journalism 
for a pro-Nazi Belgian newspaper.  De Man, of course, was one of the 
major figures in the development of literary deconstruction.  In the past, 
literary critics had occasionally charged that deconstructive claims that 
all social meanings were unstable, all interpretations provisional, and all 
truths uncertain suggested that no definitive moral or political 
consequences could be assigned to any event or any text.  Hence, 
deconstruction was politically conservative or, at the very least, led to 
political passivity.  Now, critics of deconstruction began to insinuate 
that de Man embraced interpretive theories that reveled in ambiguity 
and indeterminacy in order to assuage his guilty conscience over 
collaborating with the Nazis.  The ensuing controversy surely affected 
de Man’s friend Jacques Derrida, a Jew who was a teenager during 
World War II.  Whether directly or indirectly, the de Man affair led 
many thinkers, including Derrida, to consider the question of 
deconstruction’s relationship to justice much more closely.26 
In response to his critics, Derrida insisted that deconstruction had 
always been focused on normative questions and, particularly, questions 
of justice.  He even offered the provocative claim that “Deconstruction 
is justice.”27  (At the same time, Derrida insisted that justice is 
impossible, which, one presumes, implies that deconstruction is also 
impossible.)  Drucilla Cornell’s “philosophy of the limit” builds on 
Derrida’s work, combining it with feminist legal theory and the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas.28  In her view, deconstruction has an important 
relationship to ethics for two reasons.  First, deconstruction calls 
attention to our ineradicable difference from other persons.  Hence, 
Cornell argues, deconstruction emphasizes our responsibility to respond 
to and recognize the other as an other.  This responsibility in turn 
demands that we make ourselves open to the views and concerns of 
other persons.  Second, Cornell argues that all systems of positive law 
have gaps and paradoxes that cannot be overcome.  Deconstruction is 
justice because justice resides in these gaps and paradoxes.  In Derrida’s 
terms, justice is an “impossible demand.”  Deconstruction helps us to 
 
 25 See Balkin, supra note 22; see also Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided:” 
Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677 (2005) (arguing that a flexible 
conception of legal culture is consistent with the social construction of legal actors).  
 26 See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man’s 
War, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 590 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1988). 
 27 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990). 
 28 See DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT (1992). 
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see this impossibility in all systems of positive law. 
Despite Cornell’s efforts on Derrida’s behalf, Derrida’s own 
remarks on the relationship of deconstruction and justice seem muddled.  
Whatever the philosophical underpinnings of deconstruction might be, 
deconstructive techniques (for example, the inversion of conceptual 
hierarchies and the concept of iterability) have no necessary ethical 
stance.  It is easy enough to produce deconstructive arguments for both 
sides of any policy question, especially since all texts are capable of 
deconstruction.  Derrida’s suggestion that deconstruction is always on 
the side of the angels leads to the implausible position that if a 
purportedly deconstructive argument were used for a base or immoral 
purpose, it was not really deconstruction after all.29 
In equating deconstruction and justice, Derrida attempted to take 
the moral high ground in the face of the assaults leveled at 
deconstruction (and at him) following the de Man affair.  But what 
Derrida and his followers have not fully faced, I think, is that in 
practice, deconstructive argument is a species of rhetoric, and, like all 
rhetoric, it can be used for good or for ill depending on how it is 
wielded.  Deconstruction is no more and no less noble than the forms of 
rhetoric that deconstructionists repeatedly discover in philosophical and 
literary texts.  Deconstruction cannot flee from its own rhetoricity, or 
the normative consequences of that fact.  The deconstructive claim that 
“iterability alters”—that texts take on new and conflicting meanings 
when they are inserted into new contexts—surely applies as much to 
deconstruction itself as to any of its objects.  Thus, it is not surprising 
that deconstructive arguments can be invoked by the political right as 
well as the political left, and that they can serve many different and 
conflicting positions. 
Is there any relationship between deconstruction and justice, then?  
I believe that the strategy of trying to show that deconstruction is an 
inherently good thing is the wrong way to approach this question.  
Rather, we should ask ourselves what kind of deconstruction would 
assist us in the discussion and analysis of what is just and unjust.  The 
question is not whether deconstruction is justice, but what kind of 
deconstruction could assist us in the pursuit of the just.  Such a 
deconstruction always has a critical or ameliorative purpose; we use it 
to figure out what would be more and less just, even though people may 
disagree about these questions, and even though the deconstructor may 
ultimately be mistaken about them.30 
It is important to note that not all deconstruction has this critical or 
 
 29 See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 
812, 827 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1989) (rejecting the claim of a critic that deconstruction can be 
used for either “fascist” or “liberal” purposes). 
 30 See J.M. Balkin, Being Just with Deconstruction, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 393 (1994). 
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ameliorative purpose.  After all, we might simply deconstruct texts in 
order to discover their multiple meanings and internal tensions.  In order 
to distinguish these other possible uses of deconstruction, I give this 
normative and critical form of deconstruction a special name.  For 
reasons to be described presently, I call it “transcendental 
deconstruction.” 
If we deconstruct law for a critical purpose, it must be because we 
believe that there is some gap or divergence between the law and what 
justice requires.  In other words, the critical use of deconstruction 
presupposes a conceptual opposition between law and justice.  
Deconstructive theory, however, also tells us that every conceptual 
opposition can be reinterpreted as a nested opposition.  So, there is a 
complex relationship of mutual dependence and differentiation between 
these two concepts.  What is this relationship? 
Laws apportion responsibility, create rights and duties, and provide 
rules for conduct and social ordering.  But law can never achieve perfect 
justice.  Law is always to some extent unjust.  At the same time, our 
notions of justice can only be articulated and enforced through human 
laws and conventions.  Although we may have an ideal of a justice that 
always escapes human law and human convention, the only tools we 
have to express and enforce our ideal are laws and conventions.  Our 
conception of justice relies for its articulation and enforcement on the 
imperfect laws, conventions, and cultural norms from which it must 
always be distinguished. 
This, then, is the nested opposition of law and justice: human law, 
culture, and convention are never perfectly just, but justice needs human 
law, culture, and convention to be articulated and enforced.  A 
fundamental inadequacy always exists between the demands of justice 
and the products of culture, but we can only express this inadequacy 
through the cultural means at our disposal. 
Yet, if human legal creations are always to some degree unjust, 
justice cannot be fully and finally determined by any positive norms of 
human law, culture, or convention; for these positive norms must also 
fall short of our value of justice.  Thus, we must think of justice as an 
insatiable demand that can never be fulfilled by human law.  We must 
postulate a value of justice that transcends each and every example of 
justice in human law, culture, and convention.  In this way, 
deconstructive argument encourages us to recognize a transcendent 
value of justice.  Hence, the critical use of deconstruction becomes 
“transcendental” deconstruction, because it must presuppose the 
existence of transcendent human values articulated in culture but never 
adequately captured by culture.31 
 
 31 See J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
1131 (1994).  The argument for a transcendent value of justice is “transcendental” because it 
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The debates about deconstruction’s relationship to justice show 
how far deconstruction has mutated since its introduction into the legal 
academy.  This is indeed a case where “iterability alters.”  While legal 
deconstruction remains similar to its literary and philosophical 
forbearers, it has adapted itself to the peculiar concerns of legal 
argument.  On the one hand, legal deconstruction has emphasized the 
rhetorical nature of deconstruction, the selectivity of deconstructive 
arguments, and their implicit appeal to transcendent values.  On the 
other hand, each of these features was already present in literary and 
philosophical deconstruction, although perhaps not noticed or 
emphasized.  Legal deconstruction has, in this sense, deconstructed the 
practice of deconstruction itself, revealing more clearly its conflicting 
commitments and assumptions, both that which it privileges and that 
which it suppresses.  Yet, before one rushes to label the development of 
legal deconstruction a betrayal of the deconstructive tradition, one 
might well recall the admonition—made by deconstruction itself—that 
the relationship between tradition and betrayal is always more 
complicated than it first appears. 
 
 
claims that this value is a necessary presupposition to deconstructive arguments about justice. 
